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Sebastian has a background as a research assistant and security analyst focusing on political Islam and the intersection of formal and informal powers in the Horn of Africa, among others as a Consultant on Somalia for the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Hubertus can be reached at hjuergenliemk[at]globalgovernance. Dimitris is a Senior Fellow in the Forward Studies and Innovation section where he focuses on implementing innovation processes within education and industry. Through his personal interests and extensive professional experience, Dimitris has gained significant experience in programme management aspects and insights into EU policies and programmes.

From to , Joachim was Dean of Vesalius College of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel VUB , where he devised, led and implemented an ambitious reform process turning the College from a Liberal Arts College to an interdisciplinary undergraduate, graduate and executive school of global affairs. His expertise includes European and Global Diplomacy, UN, EU and NATO approaches to peacekeeping, peacebuilding and global security governance, cooperation and rivalry between international organizations and rapid reaction approaches to crisis management.

He is the author of several publications on the theme of environmental public affairs. Contact: tlong globalgovernance. He is also a Visiting Professor in the Faculty of Business and Economics at the University of Hong Kong where he teaches on trade policy and climate change and trade. Low holds a PhD in Economics and has published widely on trade and trade policy issues. In this function, he oversaw policy development on the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping in particular the DPKO Policy for the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping , including policy planning on protection, guidance and training development, support to peacekeeping missions, and engagement with Member States and guided policy development on a range of UN military and humanitarian guidance, including the DPKO Comprehensive Protection of Civilians training package, UN Infantry Battalion Manual, and Protection Cluster guidance on the civilian and humanitarian character of IDP camps and settlements.

Press with H. Wilmot, edited by Marc Weller, March, His research has appeared in top journals in the US and in Europe and it has won several journal and conference prizes. He is an expert in foresight and scenario planning. Medlir Mema Ph. He wrote his dissertation on the role of the civil society in the drafting of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

Medlir's research attempts to provide an answer to the broader questions of whether, how, and under what conditions advocacy networks shape international institutions and state behavior. He is currently working on an examination of the role of the international community in the creation of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, as well as the political and legal implications of doing so. He is also the author of several papers which he has presented at various academic conferences. Molly is an Analyst in the Cyber Governance unit, leading its research on cyber security and researching related civil liberty issues such as privacy and transparency.

Her professional and academic experience spans the USA and Europe, focusing on public policy and discourse. Molly currently works as a Policy and Research Analyst, examining the current strategies in cyber security policy and discourse and the implications of global governance. Her area of expertise lies in the field of international organizations and peacekeeping - with particular emphasis on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations. He joined the United Nations after a distinguished career in the diplomatic service of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

During the course of his diplomatic career, he served on the Policy Planning Staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, represented Nigeria in several countries, and participated in various bilateral political and multilateral economic negotiations. He is widely published and has written on a wide range of issues, including peacebuilding, public service reforms, institutional development, governance, regulatory policy and management, and international trade. His expertise lies in higher education capacity-building, digital transformation in academia, and blended learning instructional design.

His research interests include institutional design and international security policy concerning nuclear technology, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and robotics. Andrew is a Ph. Ruben is a doctoral student in International Relations at the University of Oxford. His doctoral project seeks to clarify the preventive dimension of the R2P, i. He has an M. Christian E. He works on the international relations of Regional Powers, regional power dynamics and their role in regional integration mechanisms. His area focus is mostly Latin America, especially but not exclusively Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil.

He is a lecturer in contemporary history and international relations in Berlin, as well as a regular contributor to the Annual Register in London. Her area of expertise is UN peacekeeping, in particular political processes, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and negotiations with armed groups. Daniel Sheffer is an Analyst in the Peace and Security section.

His research deals with analyzing issues of concern in the fields of international development as well as peace and security through the lens of cultural and religious particularities. She is currently also a trainee lawyer at Nottingham Law Centre which provides disadvantaged communities with legal advice and representation in debt, welfare rights, employment and housing. She is also a researcher for an immigration, asylum and human rights law firm.

She completed her LL. M at the University of Toronto as a Commonwealth Scholar with a dissertation on the use of force in respect of Iran's nuclear activities. Prior to this, she gained legal and human rights experience in London, Toronto, Malawi and Sierra Leone. Giulia can be contacted at gtercovich[at]globalgovernance.

Tolksdorf holds a B. All eyes turned to him when the civilian, who worked for the CIA, asked which of the three sites would provide the best landing area for planes. LeMay explained that he was completely in the dark and needed more information before he would hazard a guess. He asked how many troops would be involved in the landing. The answer, that there would be , dumbfounded him. There was no way, he told them, that an operation would succeed with so few troops. The briefer cut him short. Over the next month, LeMay tried unsuccessfully to get information about the impending invasion.

Then on April 16 he stood in for White—again out of town—at another meeting. Just one day before the planned invasion, he finally learned some of the basics of the plan. Cuban exiles had been trained as an invasion force by the CIA and former U. The exiles would land in Cuba with the aid of old World War II bombers with Cuban markings and try to instigate a counterrevolution.

It was an intricate plan that depended on every phase working perfectly. LeMay saw immediately that the invasion force would need the air cover of U. But the Secretary of Defense was not present at the meeting. LeMay did not mince words. LeMay explained that without air support, the landing forces were doomed.

Gilpatric responded with a shrug. The entire operation went against everything LeMay had learned in his thirty-three years of experience. In any military operation, especially one of this significance, a plan cannot depend on every step going right. Most steps do not go right and a great deal of padding must be built in to compensate for those unforeseen problems. It went back to the LeMay doctrine—hitting an enemy with everything you had at your disposal if you have already come to the conclusion that a military engagement is your only option.

Use everything, so there is no chance of failure. Limited, half-hearted endeavors are doomed. The Bay of Pigs invasion turned out to be a disaster for the Kennedy administration. Kennedy realized it too late. The men were either killed or taken prisoner. All of this made Kennedy look weak and inexperienced. A short time later, Kennedy went out to a golf course with his old friend, Charles Bartlett, a journalist. This was not quite true. Kennedy put the blame squarely on the CIA and on himself for going along with the ill-conceived plan.

The incident forced Kennedy to grow in office. Although his relationship with the military did suffer, the problems between Kennedy and the Pentagon predated the Bay of Pigs Invasion. According to his chief aid and speechwriter, Ted Sorensen, Kennedy was unawed by Generals. LeMay was especially incensed when McNamara brought in a group of brilliant, young statisticians as an additional civilian buffer between the ranks of professional military advisers and the White House. They became known as the Defense Intellectuals. This ran against his personality—as LeMay approached almost everything in his life with a feeling of self-doubt, he was actually surprised when things worked out well.

Here he saw the opposite—inexperienced people coming in absolutely sure of themselves and ultimately making the wrong decisions with terrible consequences. On 14th October a US spy plane flying over Cuba reported the installation of Russian nuclear missile bases. The picture left is one of those taken from the spy plane and clearly shows missile transporter trailers and tents where fuelling and maintenance took place. In Russian missiles were inferior to American missiles and had a limited range.

This meant that American missiles could be fired on Russia but Russian missiles could only be fired on Europe. Stationing missiles on Cuba the only western communist country meant that Russian missiles could now be fired on America. The Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, welcomed the Russian deployment since it would offer additional protection against any American invasion like the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in The group remained on alert and met continuously but were split between those who wanted to take military action and those that wanted a diplomatic solution.

On October 22nd Kennedy made the news of the installations public and announced that he would place a naval blockade around Cuba to prevent Russian missiles from reaching the bases. However, despite the blockade, Russian ships carrying the missiles remained on track for Cuba. Additionally the second letter which was much more demanding and aggressive in tone did not offer a solution to end the conflict.

Attorney General, Robert Kennedy suggested that the best solution was for the second letter be ignored and that the US reply to Kruschev accepting the terms of the first letter.

The Cold War: Causes, Major Events, and How it Ended

A letter was duly drafted and sent. On Sunday 28th October Kruschev called a meeting of his advisors. The Russians were aware that President Kennedy was scheduled to address the American people at 5pm that day. Fearing that it could be an announcement of war Kruschev decided to agree to the terms and rushed a response to reach the President before 5pm. The crisis was over. The Russians duly removed their bases from Cuba and as agreed US missiles were quietly removed from Turkey some months later. In the summer of , negotiations on a treaty to ban above ground nuclear testing dominated the political world.

The treaty involved seventeen countries, but the two main players were the United States and the Soviet Union. Throughout the s, with the megaton load of nuclear bombs growing, nuclear fallout from tests had become a health hazard, and by the s, it was enough to worry scientists. Kennedy, in particular, was pushing for a ban and was optimistic about succeeding. It never happened. The result of the Cuban Missile Crisis was an increasing buildup of nuclear weapons that continued until the end of the Cold War.

LeMay did not see any military advantage for the U. He doubted the countries would come to an agreement and felt vindicated when the talks deadlocked by the end of the summer. The agreement was ultimately signed the following spring, though, and remains one of the crowning achievements of the Kennedy Administration. Completely unnoticed that summer was the sailing of Soviet cargo ships bound for Cuba.

With the U. But these particular ships were part of a larger military endeavor that would bring the two powers to the most frightening standoff of the Cold War. Sailing under false manifest, these cargo ships were secretly bringing Soviet-made, medium range ballistic missiles to be deployed in Cuba. Once operational, these highly accurate missiles would be capable of striking as far north as Washington, D. An army of over 40, technicians sailed as well. Because the Soviets did not want their plan to be detected by American surveillance planes, the human cargo was forced to stay beneath the deck during the heat of the day.

They were allowed to come topside only at night, and for a short time. The ocean crossing, which lasted over a month, was horrendous for the Soviet advisers. The first unmistakable evidence of the Soviet missiles came from a U-2 reconnaissance flight over the island on October 14, , that showed the first of twenty-four launching pads being constructed to accommodate forty-two R medium range missiles that had the potential to deliver forty-five nuclear warheads almost anywhere in the eastern half of the United States. Kennedy suddenly saw that he had been deceived by Krushchev and convened a war cabinet called ExCom Executive Committee of the National Security Council , which included the Secretaries of State and Defense Rusk and McNamara , as well as his closest advisers.

At the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs began planning for an immediate air assault, followed by a full invasion. Kennedy wanted everything done secretly. He had been caught short, but he did not want the Russians to know that he knew their plan until he had decided his own response and could announce it to the world.

Kennedy shared his decision to pursue negotiation and a naval blockade of Cuba while keeping the option of an all-out invasion on the table with the Joint Chiefs on Friday, October Of all the Chiefs, Kennedy and his team saw LeMay as the most intractable. But that impression may have come from his demeanor, his candor, and perhaps his facial expressions, since he was not the most belligerent of the Chiefs. Shoup was crude and angry at times.

LeMay differed from Kennedy and McNamara on the basic concept of nuclear weapons. Back on Tinian, LeMay thought the use of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, although certainly larger than all other weapons used, were really not all that different from other bombs. He based this on the fact that many more people were killed in his first incendiary raid on Tokyo five months earlier than with either atomic bomb.

But McNamara and Kennedy realized that there was a world of difference between two bombs in the hands of one nation in and the growing arsenals of several nations in Upon entering office and taking responsibility for the nuclear decision during the most dangerous period of the Cold War, Kennedy came to loathe the destructive possibilities of this type of warfare. McNamara would sway both ways during the Cuban Missile Crisis, making sure that the military option was always there and available, but also trying to help the President find a negotiated way out.

His proportional response strategy that would come into play in Vietnam in the Johnson Administration three years later was born in the reality of the dangers that came out of the Cuban crisis. Finally, Nikita Krushchev, who created the crisis, brought it to an end by backing down and agreeing to remove the weapons.

As a political officer in the Red Army during the worst of World War II, at the siege of Stalingrad, the Soviet leader understood what could happen if things got out of hand. In an effort to help him save face, Kennedy made it clear to everyone around him that there would be no gloating over this victory. Castro, on the other hand was quite different in his response. There was also a feeling of letdown among the Joint Chiefs.

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They thought the U. They also did not trust the Russians to stand by their promise to dismantle and take home all the missiles. The Soviets had a long track record of breaking most of their previous agreements. LeMay considered the final negotiated settlement the greatest appeasement since Munich. It was a hollow gesture as they were scheduled to be removed already, but it allowed Krushchev to save face internationally. Castro continued to be a thorn in the side of the United States.

But ultimately, he was mostly inconsequential. Despite his Quaker roots, Nixon had a reputation as a staunch anticommunist. This plan was part of his broader theory that came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine. Nixon and Henry Kissinger first as national security adviser and then secretary of state agreed on the need to accept the world as it was—conflicted and competitive— and to make the most of it.

Containing communism was no longer U. In a multipolar world—comprising the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Europe, and Japan—America could work even with communist countries as long as they promoted global stability, the new core of U. Gone was the Truman-Eisenhower-Kennedy understanding that a loss of freedom anywhere was a loss of freedom everywhere. Nixon was most lucid about the Nixon Doctrine in his June commencement speech at the U.

Naval Academy. He suggested that U. But the president spent much of his speech on what he really thought was important: making his kind of realism the basis for American foreign policy in general and Cold War policy in particular. Because there were limits to what America could achieve and because U. The Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy team went to work, beginning with Vietnam. In four years, the Nixon administration reduced American forces in Vietnam from , to twenty-four thousand. Spending dropped from twenty-five billion dollars a year to less than three billion.

In , the president abolished the draft, eliminating a primary issue of the anti-war protestors. At the same time, he kept up the American bombing in North Vietnam and added targets in Cambodia and Laos that were being used by Vietcong forces as sanctuaries, while seeking a negotiated end to the war. An impatient Congress and public pressed the administration for swifter results and accurate accounts of the war.

President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had been guilty of making egregiously false claims about gains and losses in Vietnam. Escalation of the war produced widespread student protests, including a tragic confrontation at Kent State University, where four students were killed by inexperienced members of the Ohio National Guard. On June 24, the Senate decisively repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which had first authorized the use of U.

But the Nixon Doctrine also contained elements of force. Nixon tried to exploit the open differences between the Soviet Union and Communist China, reflected in the armed clashes in March along the Sino-Soviet border. Nixon warned the Kremlin secretly that the United States would not take lightly any Soviet attack on China. It hardly mattered that the United States could maintain aircraft carriers in South Vietnamese waters and use planes based in Taiwan and Thailand if Hanoi broke the accords.

The North Vietnamese began violating the peace treaty as soon as it was signed, moving men and equipment into South Vietnam to rebuild their almost decimated forces. The only tangible result was that in August an angry Congress cut off the funds for such bombing. In November , it passed a War Powers Resolution requiring the president to inform Congress within forty-eight hours of any overseas deployment of U. It is possible, although doubtful, that Nixon and Kissinger might have come up with a scheme to extend aid to the beleaguered South Vietnamese, but the Watergate scandal engulfed the Nixon White House, ending the reign of the Nixon Doctrine.

The Book of Job

He acknowledged his personal defeat in August , resigning as president—the first president in U. In January North Vietnam launched a general invasion, and one million refugees fled from central South Vietnam toward Saigon. The new president, Gerald R. Ten days later, North Vietnamese forces took Saigon, and Marine helicopters lifted American officials and a few Vietnamese allies from the rooftop of the U.

South Vietnam was no more. But the dominoes had only begun to fall. Between April and the beginning of , the Marxist-Leninists ruling Cambodia killed an estimated 1. Widespread atrocities also took place in Laos, which remains under communist rule to this day. The Arab-Israeli war the Yom Kippur War , in which the Soviet Union openly supported Syria and Egypt with a massive sea and air lift of arms and supplies, also set back detente. When the Israelis turned the tide and came close to destroying Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal, Brezhnev threatened to intervene.

Nixon put the U. The Carter Foreign Policy has been summarized by some analysts as good intentions gone wrong. So he set about eliminating the causes of conflict. He negotiated a treaty turning over the Panama Canal to Panamanian control by the end of the century. He cut off U.

Leona Lillian Abban

As part of its human rights campaign, the Carter administration advised the Iranian military not to suppress accelerating pro-Islamic demonstrations and riots. The shah of Iran, the chief U. Carter made the mistake of admitting publicly that he felt the same helplessness that a powerful person feels when his child is kidnapped.

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  5. The renowned scholar of foreign affairs Jeane Kirkpatrick later the U. The foreign policy of the Carter administration failed not for lack of good intentions but for lack of realism about the nature of traditional versus revolutionary autocracies and the relation of each to the American national interest. They were an historic achievement but had little impact on the Cold War. Ronald Reagan would permanently change the global picture, which looked bleak when he took office in From martial law in Poland imposed by the communist regime and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and communist rule in Mozambique and Angola, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev claimed victories for Marxism-Leninism.

    Within the free world, the Atlantic alliance was strained. To counter the deployment in the late s of Soviet SS intermediate-range nuclear missiles aimed at major European cities, NATO proposed a dual-track approach—negotiations to remove the missiles and the deployment of U. Pershing II and cruise missiles aimed at Soviet cities. Reagan put the deployment of the Euromissiles at the center of his new foreign policy. Unlike the foreign policy realists who viewed all regimes through the same lens, Reagan placed regime differences at the heart of his understanding of the Cold War.

    With his modest Illinois roots and biblical Christian faith learned from his mother, he emerged as a screen star and a committed anticommunist, fighting communist efforts to take over the Hollywood trade unions in the postwar period. Poor eyesight kept him stateside with the army during World War II, but his varied experiences contributed to his appreciation of the need for military strength. Two terms as a Republican governor of California confirmed his conservative, pro-freedom political views.

    Reagan considered communism to be a disease and regarded the Soviet government as illegitimate. Like Truman, he believed Soviet foreign policy to be offensive by its very nature, and he saw the world as engaged in an ideological struggle between communism and liberal democracy. But unlike Truman, he sought in the circumstances of the s not merely to contain the USSR but to defeat it. Reagan had endorsed the strategy and insights of NSC 68 shortly after that key document of the Truman administration was declassified and published in , devoting several of his radio commentaries to it.

    Also in the s, he called for reductions, not limitations, in U. He identified as central weaknesses of the Soviet bloc the denial of religious freedom and the inability to provide consumer goods. In a radio commentary, Reagan remarked that the pope, in his final public appearance, had invited the people to bring forward several large crosses for his blessing.

    Suddenly there was movement among the multitude of young people before him. Try to make a Polish joke out of that. For Reagan, as for Truman, the gravest threat to the United States and the free world came from the Soviet Union, whose continuing imperialist designs on every continent demanded a new Cold War strategy. It approved U. To his credit, President Carter had begun helping the anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan during his final months in office. But a key Reagan decision was to supply Stinger ground-to-air missiles, which the mujahideen promptly used to shoot down the Soviet helicopters that had kept them on the defensive for years.

    In Latin America, the Sandinistas were not only establishing a Leninist state in Nicaragua but supporting communist guerrillas in El Salvador and elsewhere. The Reagan administration directed the CIA to form an antiSandinista movement—the Contras—and asked Congress to approve funds for them.

    Reagan never contemplated sending U. He believed that with sufficient military support and firm diplomatic negotiation, Nicaraguans could rid themselves of the Marxist regime. He was proved correct by the results of the democratic elections of February , when the anti-Sandinista Violeta Chamorro decisively defeated the Sandinista commandante Daniel Ortega for president.

    With people, funds, and weapons, the Reagan Doctrine pushed containment to its logical conclusion by helping those who wanted to win their freedom. After months of strikes, roundtable talks began in Poland between leaders of the still-outlawed Solidarity union and the communist government.

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    What would follow was a domino-like collapse of socialism throughout Eastern Europe and, eventually, Russia itself. The pivotal year of was later dubbed the Year of Miracles. Thousands did. In October hundreds of thousands of people began demonstrating every Monday evening in East Germany, leading to the forced resignation of Communist Party boss Erich Honecker, who had boasted in January that the Berlin Wall would stand for another hundred years.